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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 
Diane Blair brought suit in the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania against Scott 
Specialty Gases ("Scott"), her former employer, alleging 
sexual harassment and discrimination in violation of Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. S 2000e et seq. 
(2001), the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (PHRA), 43 
Pa. Cons. Stat. S 951 et seq. (2001), the Equal Rights 
provision of the Pennsylvania Constitution, Pa. Const. art. 
I, S 28, and other state claims. The District Court order on 
appeal dismissed Blair's complaint without prejudice 
pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. S 4 
(2001), and directed the parties to arbitrate the claims 
pursuant to the terms of their arbitration agreement. Blair 
argues on appeal that the arbitration agreement is invalid 
and unenforceable, and that the agreement violates public 
policy by requiring the employee to pay one-half of the 
arbitrator's fees. 
 
I. 
 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
Blair was employed by Scott, a producer and supplier of 
specialty gas products, from January 1995 through March 
1999. In April 1997, she became the Plant Manager at the 
Plumstead Medical Products Division. Blair alleges that 
during the course of her employment she was subjected to 
discrimination and harassment based on her gender. 
 
Blair alleges that during her initial interview with one of 
the Vice-Presidents of Scott, Tom Barford, he told her he 
would "rather employ a male plant manager, with a couple 
of kids who lived nearby and wouldn't leave him high and 
dry in a few months to marry a lawyer or doctor." App. at 
66. Blair further alleges that Barford told her that he could 
not attend the sensitivity training on sexual discrimination 
and harassment "because he was a `sexist pig' and that if 
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people knew all the things he had done, he would be fired." 
App. at 67-68. In fact, Blair alleges that after she was 
hired, Barford demeaned her suggestions during meetings, 
as well as those of other female staff members, and 
routinely made sexist references to her, such as"putting 
tits on a bull" and "putting people in bed together." App. at 
67. He allegedly commented on her appearance and choice 
of clothing, and suggested, for example, that she wear 
skirts more often to show her legs. 
 
Blair resigned from her position on March 24, 1999, 
claiming that she could no longer tolerate the harassing 
work environment. Blair alleges that sometime after she 
resigned and reported the sexual harassment to Scott 
management, Barford and another Scott supervisor began 
to take retaliatory action by spreading rumors around the 
plant that Blair had engaged in an affair with a female co- 
worker. 
 
On September 20, 1999, Blair filed an administrative 
"Charge of Discrimination" with the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) that was cross-filed with 
the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission (PHRC). 
Both the EEOC and PHRC eventually dismissed her 
complaint. 
 
On July 31, 2000, Blair filed a complaint in the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania alleging sexual harassment, sex 
discrimination, and constructive discharge under Title VII, 
the PHRA, the Pennsylvania Constitution, and state 
common law claims of intentional infliction of emotional 
distress, defamation, negligent employment, breach of 
contract, and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing. Scott filed a motion to dismiss, or in the alternative 
for summary judgment, on the ground that Blair had 
agreed to submit all claims relating to her employment to 
binding arbitration. A mandatory arbitration provision had 
been placed by Scott in an updated employee handbook 
that was distributed to all employees in February 1998. 
Blair, who was given the assignment of making sure that all 
of the Medical Products' employees signed an 
"Acknowledgment of Receipt and Reading" of the revised 
handbook, signed such an acknowledgment on February 
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27, 1998. That acknowledgment stated that she had read 
the arbitration provision and agreed to submit any disputes 
arising out of her employment to a final and binding 
arbitration. 
 
In response to Scott's motion to dismiss based on the 
arbitration agreement, Blair argued that the arbitration 
agreement was not a validly formed contract and thus was 
not binding and, in the alternative, that the agreement 
should not be enforced on public policy grounds because it 
required her to pay one-half of the arbitrator's fees. 
 
The District Court granted summary judgment to Scott, 
and initially dismissed Blair's complaint with prejudice. On 
Blair's motion for reconsideration, the District Court 
modified the order to dismiss the case without prejudice 
pursuant to 9 U.S.C. S 4, and ordered the parties to 
arbitrate their claims as directed by the arbitration 
agreement. Blair filed a timely notice of appeal. On 
November 30, 2000, she also filed for arbitration before the 
American Arbitration Association (AAA) as directed by the 
arbitration agreement but requested that the AAA hold her 
case in abeyance pending the outcome of these 
proceedings. 
 
II. 
 
JURISDICTION 
 
Scott argues, as a threshold matter, that this court does 
not have jurisdiction on the ground that the District Court's 
modified order was not final or appealable because it 
dismissed Blair's claims without prejudice and ordered the 
parties to arbitrate. Scott argues that the court's order 
effectively acted as a stay of the proceedings pending the 
outcome of the arbitration. Under the FAA, a stay is 
considered an interlocutory order that may not be 
appealed. 9 U.S.C. S 16(b)(1).  
 
Scott relies on Smith v. The Equitable, 209 F.3d 268 (3d 
Cir. 2000), where we held, on facts similar to the present 
case, that the dismissal of an employment discrimination 
case without prejudice with an order to compel arbitration 
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was not a final appealable order. Smith, an African 
American, brought suit in federal court alleging that the 
defendant company's decision not to hire him was based on 
his race in violation of Title VII and the PHRA. Because he 
had signed a pre-employment contract that included an 
agreement to arbitrate any employment-related disputes, 
the district court dismissed Smith's action without 
prejudice and compelled arbitration. Id. at 270. 
 
On appeal, we noted that under section 16(b) of the FAA, 
federal courts are expressly barred from taking an appeal of 
a district court's interlocutory order compelling arbitration. 
Id. at 271. Section 16 provides: 
 
       (a) An appeal may be taken from-- 
 
       (1) an order-- 
 
        (A) refusing a stay of any action under section 3 of 
       this title, 
 
        (B) denying a petition under section 4 of this title 
       to order arbitration to proceed, 
 
        (C) denying an application under section 206 of 
       this title to compel arbitration, 
 
        (D) confirming or denying confirmation of an award 
       or partial award, or 
 
        (E) modifying, correcting, or vacating an award; 
 
       (2) an interlocutory order granting, continuing, or 
       modifying an injunction against an arbitration that is 
       subject to this title; or 
 
       (3) a final decision with respect to an arbitration that 
       is subject to this title. 
 
       (b) Except as otherwise provided in section 1292(b) of 
       title 28, an appeal may not be taken from an 
       interlocutory order-- 
 
       (1) granting a stay of any action under section 3 of 
       this title; 
 
       (2) directing arbitration to proceed under section 4 of 
       this title; 
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       (3) compelling arbitration under section 206 of this 
       title; or 
 
       (4) refusing to enjoin an arbitration that is subject to 
       this title. 
 
9 U.S.C. S 16. 
 
We dismissed Smith's appeal on the ground that it was 
an interlocutory order directing arbitration to proceed 
under section 4, and therefore not appealable under 9 
U.S.C. S 16(b). We stated that a district court's order in an 
independent proceeding, one brought by the plaintiff in 
order to compel arbitration, is considered final and 
immediately appealable because it addresses the exact relief 
sought. Smith, 209 F.3d at 271. We contrasted such an 
order from an order in an "embedded" proceeding, one 
where the defendant, rather than the plaintiff, moves to 
compel enforcement of the arbitration agreement as a 
defense to claims brought before the court. We noted that 
the latter traditionally had been considered interlocutory 
and not immediately appealable. Id. 
 
In Smith, we recognized the apparent anomaly of treating 
these types of proceedings differently but pointed to the 
rationale we had previously applied " `that an order 
directing arbitration is interlocutory and, therefore, not 
appealable if it is made in a lawsuit, such as a suit for 
damages, in which in the normal course of judicial 
procedure there will be a later final order or judgment from 
which an appeal can be taken by a person aggrieved by the 
prior order to arbitrate.' " Id. at 271 (quoting Zosky v. 
Boyer, 856 F.2d 554, 558 (3d Cir. 1988) (quoting Rogers v. 
Schering Corp., 262 F.2d 180, 182 (3d Cir. 1959))). We 
stated that the district court's decision to dismiss the 
proceedings rather than stay the proceedings under 9 
U.S.C. S 3, was appropriate "for reasons of judicial 
efficiency" when " `all the claims involved in an action are 
arbitrable.' " Smith, 209 F.3d at 272 (quoting Seus v. John 
Nuveen & Co., Inc., 146 F.3d 175, 179 (3d Cir. 1998)). We 
also noted that the dismissal "was the functional equivalent 
of a stay" since the plaintiff could test the validity of the 
arbitration agreement before the arbitrator and then, if 
necessary, challenge the arbitration award in the district 
court. Id. 
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The continued viability of the holding and rationale in 
Smith and earlier cases must be examined in light of the 
Supreme Court's recent decision in Green Tree Financial 
Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000), which Blair 
contends is inconsistent with Smith and establishes our 
jurisdiction over this appeal. In Green Tree, the plaintiff 
sued the companies that had financed her purchase of her 
mobile home alleging that they violated the Truth in 
Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. S 1601 et seq. and the Equal Credit 
Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. SS 1691-1691f. Green Tree, 531 
U.S. at 82-83. The district court granted the defendants' 
motion to compel arbitration and dismissed the plaintiff's 
claims with prejudice. The court of appeals rejected the 
defendants' challenge to its jurisdiction on the ground that 
the order was not appealable. Randolph v. Green Tree Fin. 
Corp.-Alabama, 178 F.3d 1149, 1156-57 (11th Cir. 1999). 
 
The Supreme Court pointed to the well-established 
definition of a "final decision" as a decision that "ends the 
litigation on the merits and leaves nothing more for the 
court to do but execute the judgment." Green Tree, 531 
U.S. at 86 (quotations omitted). The Court then held that 
the district court's order directing the parties to arbitrate 
and dismissing the plaintiff's claims with prejudice"plainly 
disposed of the entire case on the merits and left no part of 
it pending before the court." Id. The ability of a party to an 
arbitration to bring a later proceeding in a district court to 
enter judgment on an arbitration award or vacate or modify 
that award "does not vitiate the finality of the District 
Court's resolution of the claims in the instant proceeding." 
Id. On this basis, the Court held that the district court's 
order was final and appealable. 
 
Of particular significance to the issue before us, the 
Supreme Court rejected the distinction between "embedded" 
and "independent" proceedings that we and many other 
courts of appeals had adopted. The Court noted that the 
embedded/independent distinction was not firmly 
established at the time of the enactment of FAAS 16(a)(3) 
with respect to cases "where the District Court both ordered 
arbitration and dismissed the remaining claims." Id. at 88. 
By contrast, the Court continued, the definition of"final 
decision" was firmly established at the time. Id. at 88. On 
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this basis, the Court concluded that "where . . . the District 
Court has ordered the parties to proceed to arbitration, and 
dismissed all the claims before it, that decision is`final' 
within the meaning of S 16(a)(3), and therefore appealable." 
Id. at 89. 
 
The question presented in this case is whether the 
jurisdictional holding in Green Tree, where the action had 
been dismissed with prejudice, applies equally to a case 
such as this one that was dismissed without prejudice. 
Scott argues that a dismissal without prejudice is the 
"functional equivalent of a stay," as the Smith court noted, 
and as such does not dispose of the claims on the merits. 
Scott directs our attention to a footnote in Green Tree 
which stated that "[h]ad the District Court entered a stay 
instead of a dismissal in this case, that order would not be 
appealable." Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 87 (citing 9 U.S.C. 
S 16(b)(1)). 
 
The Supreme Court did not comment on whether a 
dismissal without prejudice should be treated as a stay or 
as a final order, nor did it address whether the district 
court should have entered a stay instead of a dismissal. 
The Court's opinion speaks generally of "dismissals" and 
does not indicate whether it hinges on the fact that the 
dismissal was with prejudice. Nor does the statute provide 
guidance, as it does not differentiate between appeals of 
district court orders dismissing cases with or without 
prejudice. 
 
Blair argues that there is no valid distinction between a 
dismissal with prejudice and one without prejudice with 
regard to these proceedings. In both instances, there is 
nothing left for her to do but submit to arbitration, and 
nothing left for the District Court to do other than execute, 
modify, or vacate the ultimate arbitration award. No 
justiciable claims remain for the District Court to address 
outside of the arbitrable claims. Blair also argues that the 
case relied upon in Smith to find that a dismissal without 
prejudice is functionally equivalent to a stay, 
Communication Workers v. AT&T Co., 932 F.2d 199 (3d Cir. 
1991), is inapplicable. In Communication Workers , the 
district court dismissed one set of claims with leave to 
amend due to pleading irregularities and dismissed another 
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set of claims because they were arbitrable. Id.  at 204. We 
stated in that case that the district court's order dismissing 
the action because it was arbitrable was "functionally 
analogous to the grant of a stay in an ongoing proceeding 
pending the outcome of arbitration. . . . [t]hus, our result 
advances the laudable policy favoring arbitration over 
litigation." Id. at 207 (citing Zosky , 856 F.2d at 561-62). 
Because there were additional claims in that case not 
subject to arbitration that the district court gave leave to 
amend, that decision is distinguishable from the instant 
case where the District Court dismissed all of Blair's claims 
in favor of arbitration. 
 
After the decision in Green Tree, at least three courts of 
appeals have had the opportunity to address whether a 
dismissal without prejudice is a final, appealable order, or 
should be treated as a non-appealable stay. In Interactive 
Flight Technologies, Inc. v. Swissair Swiss Air Transport Co., 
249 F.3d 1177 (9th Cir. 2001), the district court had 
dismissed the complaint without prejudice and directed the 
parties to arbitrate in accordance with their agreement, and 
the court of appeals had previously dismissed the appeal 
for lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court remanded and 
directed the Ninth Circuit to reconsider the issue in light of 
Green Tree. On remand, the Ninth Circuit held that the 
district court's decision to dismiss the action without 
prejudice and order the parties to arbitrate was a final, 
appealable decision in accordance with Green Tree. The 
court noted that Green Tree overruled the Ninth Circuit's 
earlier decisions that had based their holdings on the 
distinction between embedded and independent 
proceedings and it instead used the traditional definition of 
a final order. Id. at 1179. The court then proceeded to 
address precisely the issue presented here and rejected the 
distinction between dismissals with or without prejudice. 
 
       [A]ppellees . . . suggest that the district court's 
       dismissal in this case was not final simply because it 
       was made without prejudice. We reject this argument 
       because the district court's order and judgment 
       sufficiently show that the court intended to close this 
       case without precluding the parties from bringing a 
       new action after completing arbitration. It is only in 
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       this sense that the dismissal was "without prejudice," 
       and that is not enough to show that the dismissal was 
       interlocutory rather than an appealable final decision. 
 
Id. (citing Green Tree, 121 S.Ct at 520). 
 
In a recent decision, the Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit reached the same conclusion, holding that a 
"dismissal without prejudice in favor of arbitration is an 
appealable `final decision' under 9 U.S.C. S 16(a)(3) and that 
Green Tree has overruled our precedents that distinguish 
between `independent' and `embedded' actions for purposes 
of appealability." Salim Oleochemicals v. M/V Shropshire, 
No. 01-7624, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 878, at *3 (2d Cir. Jan. 
18, 2002). The court noted that Green Tree involved a 
dismissal with prejudice, unlike the dismissal without 
prejudice before it, but stated that "dismissals with and 
without prejudice are equally appealable as final orders. 
. . . There is thus no reason to think that a dismissal 
without prejudice is any less a `final decision' under Green 
Tree than is a dismissal with prejudice." Id. at *8 
 
The Eleventh Circuit held similarly. In Employers 
Insurance of Wausau v. Bright Metal Specialties, Inc., 251 
F.3d 1316 (11th Cir. 2001), the district court had dismissed 
each of the underlying actions in a construction contract 
case and granted the defendant's motion to compel 
arbitration. The Eleventh Circuit characterized Green Tree 
as holding that a "district court order compelling arbitration 
and dismissing all other claims is `final' within the meaning 
of S 16(a)(3), and therefore appealable, even when that order 
occurs in an `embedded' proceeding involving both a 
request for arbitration and other claims for relief." Id. at 
1321-22 (citing Green Tree, 121 S.Ct. at 520-21). The court 
noted that the dismissal and direction to arbitrate left the 
district court with nothing to do but execute the judgment. 
The court observed that although the "district court did not 
specify whether the dismissal was with or without 
prejudice," the "arbitration order clearly disposed of the 
entire case on the merits and left no part of it pending 
before the court. Moreover, the district court could have, 
but did not, stay the case pending arbitration." Id. at 1322 
n.6. (citing Green Tree, 121 S.Ct. at 520 n.2). 
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We agree with the reasoning in these cases. The Green 
Tree decision draws a distinction between dismissals and 
stays, but does not draw any distinctions within the 
universe of dismissals. The focus in Green Tree  is on the 
traditional definition of a "final order." Here, the District 
Court did not retain jurisdiction over any of Blair's claims 
as every claim was held to be arbitrable. Because there is 
"nothing more for the court to do but execute the 
judgment," the District Court's order falls within the 
Supreme Court's definition of an appealable final order. 
Although there remains the possible anomaly of different 
jurisdictional results depending on whether a district court 
dismisses or stays a case, the line between the two types of 
dispositions follows from the Supreme Court's language.1 
 
We conclude that even though the District Court's order 
dismissed this case without prejudice and directed the 
parties to proceed with arbitration, the order was final and 
appealable.2 We turn to Blair's challenge to the validity of 
the arbitration agreement. 
 
III. 
 
ARBITRATION AGREEMENT 
 
A. Standard of Review 
 
We review a grant of summary judgment de novo and 
must apply the same test as the district court. Omnipoint 
Communications Enters. v. Newtown Township., 219 F.3d 
240, 242 (3d Cir. 2000). A grant of summary judgment is 
appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. We have no reason to assume that a district court will enter a stay 
rather than a dismissal when all of the claims are arbitrable. Therefore, 
the issue may not arise. 
 
2. In light of our conclusion, we need not address Blair's alternative 
argument that this order is an appealable order under the collateral 
order doctrine. 
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judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The 
non-movant's allegations are to be taken as true, and when 
they "conflict with those of the movant, the former must 
receive the benefit of the doubt." Valhal Corp. v. Sullivan 
Assocs., 44 F.3d 195, 200 (3d Cir. 1995) (quoting Goodman 
v. Mead Johnson & Co., 534 F.2d 566, 573 (3d Cir. 1976)). 
 
The Supreme Court has held that in response to a 
motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party must 
"go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by 
the `depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions 
on file,' designate `specific facts showing that there is a 
genuine issue for trial.' " Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 
317, 324 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). 
 
B. Validity of Arbitration Agreement 
 
Blair first argues that the arbitration agreement is not 
supported by adequate consideration and thus is not a 
binding, enforceable contract. A federal court must 
generally look to the relevant state law on the formation of 
contracts to determine whether there is a valid arbitration 
agreement under the FAA. See, e.g., First Options of 
Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995). Before 
concluding that there is a valid contract under 
Pennsylvania law, the court must "look to: (1) whether both 
parties manifested an intention to be bound by the 
agreement; (2) whether the terms of the agreement are 
sufficiently definite to be enforced; and (3) whether there 
was consideration." ATACS Corp. v. Trans World 
Communications, Inc., 155 F.3d 659, 666 (3d Cir. 1998); see 
also Aircraft Guar. Corp. v. Strato-Lift, Inc., 103 F. Supp. 2d 
830, 836 (E.D. Pa. 2000) ("[C]ontracts are enforceable when 
parties reach a mutual agreement, exchange consideration, 
and have set forth the terms of their bargain with sufficient 
definiteness to be specifically enforced.")."Consideration 
`confers a benefit upon the promisor or causes a detriment 
to the promisee and must be an act, forbearance or return 
promise bargained for and given in exchange for the 
original promise.' " Channel Home Centers v. Grossman, 795 
F.2d 291, 299 (3d Cir. 1986) (quoting Curry v. Estate of 
Thompson, 481 A.2d 658, 661 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984)). 
 
                                13 
  
Without consideration, a contract is unenforceable. Id. at 
298-99. 
 
Blair contends that the agreement was unenforceable for 
lack of mutuality of consideration because Scott did not 
agree to be bound by the arbitration agreement. However, 
the arbitration agreement specifically states that"if any 
dispute arises from your employment with Scott, you and 
Scott agree that final resolution of the dispute will occur 
exclusively in a final and binding arbitration proceeding." 
App. at 49. The language of the agreement is clear that 
both parties agreed to be bound to the arbitration 
agreement and Blair admitted to having read that language 
when she signed the acknowledgment shortly after receipt 
of the revised handbook containing the arbitration clause. 
When both parties have agreed to be bound by arbitration, 
adequate consideration exists and the arbitration 
agreement should be enforced. See, e.g., Michalski v. Circuit 
City Stores, Inc., 177 F.3d 634, 637 (7th Cir. 1999); 
Johnson v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 148 F.3d 373, 378 (4th 
Cir. 1998). Moreover, a contract need not have mutuality of 
obligation as long as the contract is supported by 
consideration. Harris v. Green Tree Fin. Corp. , 183 F.3d 
173, 180 (3d Cir. 1999) (finding contract enforceable where 
one party had option to litigate arbitral issues in court, 
while the other party was required to invoke arbitration, 
because mutuality is not required where the requirement of 
consideration is met). 
 
Blair contends that Scott's unilateral ability to alter the 
agreement renders the agreement illusory. Blair's 
acknowledgment of the agreement reads in relevant part, 
 
       I understand that nothing in this Handbook can be 
       modified or deleted, nor can anything be added in any 
       way by oral statements or practice. Only the Executive 
       Committee of Scott Specialty Gases can change this 
       Handbook, and the change must be in writing. If Scott 
       Specialty Gases makes any material changes, it will 
       give me a copy of them, and by remaining employed by 
       Scott Specialty Gases thereafter I will be deemed to 
       have accepted these changes. 
 
App. at 23. 
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In support of her argument, Blair points to the decision 
of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Floss v. 
Ryan's Family Steak Houses, Inc., 211 F.3d 306 (6th Cir. 
2000). In that case, the court concluded that the arbitration 
agreement was illusory and unenforceable because the 
agreement gave the provider of the arbitration services the 
unlimited right to modify the arbitration rules without 
giving notice to the employee or gaining the employee's 
consent. The court held that " `[w]here a promisor retains 
an unlimited right to decide later the nature or extent of his 
performance, the promise is too indefinite for legal 
enforcement.' " Id. at 316 (quoting 1 Samuel Williston, 
Contracts S 43, at 140 (3d ed. 1957)). 
 
The District Court here distinguished Floss on the 
ground that Scott's Executive Committee retained the right 
to alter the material aspects of the agreement only after 
putting the change in writing, providing a copy to the 
employees, and allowing the employees to accept the 
change by continuing employment. Scott's right is much 
more confined than the unfettered discretion of the 
arbitration provider in Floss who could make changes to 
the agreement without notice to or consent of the 
employees. Although Blair argues that Scott has the right of 
"unilateral modification" to its handbook, Br. of Appellant 
at 13 n.1, in fact that is limited to non-material changes to 
the handbook. It is unlikely that the unfettered discretion 
to modify the agreement as to arbitration would be 
categorized as non-material and we need not hypothesize 
about that possibility. See, e.g., The American Heritage 
College Dictionary 837 (3d ed. 1993) (defining "material" as 
"[b]eing both relevant and consequential").3 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Because we conclude that Scott's promise to submit to arbitration 
serves as consideration, we need not consider Blair's argument that her 
continued employment was not adequate consideration for her 
agreement to arbitrate but we note that such an argument is 
questionable in light of decisions that have found that continued 
employment may serve as consideration. See, e.g. , Hightower v. GMRI, 
Inc., 272 F.3d 239, 243 (4th Cir. 2001); Venuto v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., No. 
98-96, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11050, at *14-15 (E.D. Pa. July 22, 1998) 
(holding that an at-will employee's continued employment provides 
adequate consideration for an arbitration provision). 
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We thus conclude that the arbitration agreement satisfies 
these basic contract principles and is not unenforceable on 
those grounds. 
 
C. Arbitrator's Fees 
 
The most far-reaching issue in this case, and the one 
that prompted filing of amicus briefs by the EEOC and the 
PHRC, is the effect of the provision in the agreement to 
arbitrate that requires Blair to pay one-half of the 
arbitrator's fees. Blair v. Scott Specialty Gases, No. 00- 
3865, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16809 at *20-21 (E.D. Pa. 
Nov. 22, 2000). The arbitration agreement provides that 
"[i]n order to make the arbitration procedure readily 
available to its employees, Scott will pay one hundred 
percent (100%) of any administrative fee required by the 
AAA [American Arbitration Association] to initiate the 
arbitration process. Other expenses will be paid by the 
parties as set forth in the applicable AAA rules." App. at 49. 
The AAA rules provide that the "arbitrator's compensation 
shall be borne equally by the parties unless they agree 
otherwise, or unless the law provides otherwise." App. at 
112. The parties have not agreed to another arrangement, 
and it is therefore uncontested that Blair is required to pay 
one-half of the arbitrator's compensation. The AAA rules 
also provide, though the parties do not address, that other 
expenses of the arbitration will be borne equally by the 
parties including the travel expenses of the arbitrator, AAA 
representatives, and witnesses produced at the direction of 
the arbitrator. 
 
The District Court rejected Blair's argument that the 
agreement is unenforceable as a result of the fee-sharing 
provision. While this court must be mindful of the"liberal 
federal policy favoring arbitration agreements," Moses H. 
Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 
24 (1983), the Supreme Court has also made clear that 
arbitration is only appropriate "so long as the prospective 
litigant effectively may vindicate [his or her] statutory cause 
of action in the arbitral forum" allowing the statute to serve 
its purposes. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 
U.S. 20, 28 (1991) (alteration in original) (quoting Mitsubishi 
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler--Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 
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614, 637 (1985)). Arbitration costs are directly related to a 
litigant's ability to pursue the claim. In Green Tree Financial 
Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000), the 
Supreme Court acknowledged that "the existence of large 
arbitration costs could preclude a litigant . . . from 
effectively vindicating her federal statutory rights in the 
arbitral forum." Id. at 90. 
 
In Green Tree, the plaintiff alleged that the financial 
institutions that had financed her mobile home violated the 
Truth in Lending Act and the Equal Opportunity Credit Act. 
The district court compelled arbitration. Plaintiff appealed, 
arguing that the arbitration agreement's silence on the 
subject of fees created a risk that she would be required to 
bear a prohibitive proportion of the arbitration costs, which 
would force her to forego arbitration and relinquish her 
rights. Id. The Eleventh Circuit agreed and reversed. When 
the matter reached the Supreme Court, it held that the 
articulated risk to the plaintiff was too "speculative" to 
justify invalidating the arbitration agreement. Id. at 91. 
 
Prior to the decision in Green Tree, the decisions of 
several courts of appeals had expressed concern about fee- 
splitting arrangements in employment arbitration 
agreements. For example, in Cole v. Burns International 
Security Services., 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997), the 
court wrote, 
 
       [W]e are unaware of any situation in American 
       jurisprudence in which a beneficiary of a federal 
       statute has been required to pay for the services of the 
       judge assigned to hear her or his case. Under Gilmer, 
       arbitration is supposed to be a reasonable substitute 
       for a judicial forum. Therefore, it would undermine 
       Congress's intent to prevent employees who are seeking 
       to vindicate statutory rights from gaining access to a 
       judicial forum and then require them to pay for the 
       services of an arbitrator when they would never be 
       required to pay for a judge in court. 
 
Id. at 1484. 
 
The Cole court held that where arbitration has been 
imposed by the employer, the employer may not require the 
employee to pay all or part of the arbitrator's fees in order 
 
                                17 
  
to pursue statutory claims under Title VII. Id.  at 1484-85. 
The parties in Cole had stipulated that arbitrator's fees vary 
between $500 to $1000 or more per day. Id. at 1480 & n.8 
(citing several articles regarding the cost of arbitration). In 
Cole, as in Green Tree, the arbitration agreement was silent 
on the allocation of the arbitrator's fees between the 
parties, and the court concluded that the employer alone 
must pay. Id. at 1481. The opinion does not indicate 
whether the court had specific proof of the claimant's 
financial position but does note that the job from which 
Cole was fired was that of a security guard, id.  at 1469, and 
that "[t]hese fees would be prohibitively expensive for an 
employee like Cole, especially after being fired from his job." 
Id. at 1484. 
 
The Tenth Circuit reached a similar result in Shankle v. 
B-G Maintenance Management of Colorado, Inc., 163 F.3d 
1230, 1234-35 (10th Cir. 1999). In Shankle, as in Cole, the 
arbitration agreement covered the employment relationship, 
but here the arbitration agreement was specific about the 
costs and required the employee to pay one-half of the 
arbitrator's fees. The court held that requiring payment 
from someone who cannot afford to pay "undermines the 
remedial and deterrent functions of the federal anti- 
discrimination laws." Id. at 1235. "[A]n arbitration 
agreement that prohibits use of the judicial forum as a 
means of resolving statutory claims must also provide for 
an effective and accessible alternative forum." Id. at 1234. 
The court noted that arbitration generally provides such an 
alternative but that the presence of a fee-splitting provision 
calls the accessibility of that alternative into question. Id. at 
1234 n.3. In Shankle, the parties had submitted their 
claims to arbitration and received a letter from the 
arbitration provider specifying the costs of arbitration. Id. at 
1232. At that point, the employee decided arbitration would 
be too expensive, canceled the arbitration, and filed suit in 
federal court. Id. The court of appeals concluded that 
Shankle, a former janitor, could not afford such a fee and 
that "it [was] unlikely other similarly situated employees 
could either." Id. at 1234-35. 
 
The District Court in the instant case refused to apply 
the decision in Shankle, finding Blair's case less compelling 
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than Shankle's because Blair had not submitted any 
evidence to demonstrate the amount of the arbitrator's fees, 
while Shankle had received a letter from the arbitrators 
indicating their rates (but not the time they expected to 
spend on the case). Blair, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16809, at 
*20. 
 
Scott cites Williams v. Cigna Financial Advisors Inc., 197 
F.3d 752 (5th Cir. 1999), in support of its position that the 
fee-sharing provision does not invalidate the agreement. 
Williams is not entirely analogous to the case before us. In 
Williams, the claimant went to arbitration, an award was 
issued, and then the claimant challenged his obligation to 
pay forum fees. Although the court noted the requirement 
that arbitration provide an adequate substitute for a 
judicial forum, it held that Williams did not demonstrate 
that the arbitrator's order to pay one-half of the fees 
prevented him from having a "full opportunity to vindicate 
his claims effectively or prevented the arbitration 
proceedings from affording him an adequate substitute for 
a federal judicial forum," since he did in fact seek a 
resolution through arbitration. Id. at 764. The court noted 
that there was no evidence that the costs were 
"prohibitively expensive" as Williams had testified in his 
arbitration hearing that his income was in excess of six 
figures. Id. at 764-65. 
 
Similarly, in Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & 
Smith, Inc., 170 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1999), the court rejected a 
claimant's argument that the possibility that the arbitrator 
may require her to bear expensive forum fees should 
invalidate the agreement. Id. at 15-16. The court reasoned 
that the levying of fees is often waived by the arbitrator and 
can always be reviewed in a judicial forum. Id.  In that case, 
the applicable arbitration rules did not require the claimant 
to pay the arbitrator's fees, but only presented the 
possibility that fees would be assessed against her. Id. 
(noting also that "arbitration is often far more affordable to 
plaintiffs and defendants alike than is pursuing a claim in 
court"); see also Koveleskie v. SBC Capital Mkts., Inc., 167 
F.3d 361, 366 (7th Cir. 1999) (following reasoning in 
Rosenberg). 
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Although the Supreme Court's decision in Green Tree was 
decided in a context different from that of an employment 
dispute, it offers the closest guidance on the issue of 
arbitration fees. The Supreme Court in Green Tree placed 
the initial burden of proof on the party resisting arbitration 
to demonstrate that arbitration would be prohibitively 
expensive by showing "the likelihood of incurring such 
costs." Id. at 92. The Court found that the plaintiff had not 
met her burden of proving the costs of the arbitration or 
her inability to pay. However, the Court suggested an 
eventual burden shift when it stated that "[h]ow detailed 
the showing of prohibitive expense must be before the party 
seeking arbitration must come forward with contrary 
evidence is a matter we need not discuss[ ] for . . . neither 
during discovery nor when the case was presented on the 
merits was there any timely showing at all on the point." Id. 
 
Scott argues that no burden shift is required under Green 
Tree, but as the language quoted above demonstrates, a 
shift is contemplated. The Court simply never reached the 
level of proof required to shift the burden because the 
plaintiff in that case failed to present evidence to show she 
would "be saddled with prohibitive costs." Id. at 91. The 
arbitration agreement was silent on the allocation of fees 
and the parties had not designated a particular arbitration 
association or arbitrator to resolve the dispute. 531 U.S. at 
90 n.6. The Green Tree Court concluded that the AAA 
informational material plaintiff provided (which did not 
discuss fees), an article citing average fees for arbitrators, 
and her citations to fees referenced in other court 
decisions, were insufficient proof of likely costs in the case 
before it. Id. at 91 n.6. 
 
The Green Tree decision thus informs us that claimants 
have the burden to come forward with some evidence to 
show the projected fees that would apply to their specific 
arbitrations. We draw support for that inference from the 
Court's rejection of the position of the four dissenting 
justices that the burden should be on the defendant who 
has superior information about the cost of pursuing 
arbitration to show that the arbitral forum will not be 
financially inaccessible. 531 U.S. at 96 (Ginsburg, J., 
dissent). 
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In this case, the District Court, in a decision that 
predated Green Tree, held that Blair had not met her 
burden since she failed to offer proper evidence of her 
inability to pay or of the amount of the arbitrator's fees. The 
court also noted that Blair did not produce any evidence 
that she attempted to reach an agreement with Scott 
providing that Scott would pay her share of the fees. Blair, 
2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16809, at *21. 
 
Blair argues that the affidavit she submitted setting forth 
her financial status comprised sufficiently competent 
evidence that she could not afford to pay the arbitrator's 
fees. Her affidavit states that she "can't afford to pay the 
costs of taking [her] case to arbitration" and sets forth the 
amounts of her assets (her car and house), monthly 
income, debt, and monthly bills. App. at 120. The affidavit 
indicates that her monthly bills exceed her monthly income 
by $182 per month and that her debt exceeds her assets by 
$57,000. App. at 120. However, Blair did not attach any 
documents to support these figures, such as copies of bank 
statements and bills. 
 
In rejecting Blair's submission as inadequate, the District 
Court cited cases holding that conclusory, self-serving 
affidavits are insufficient to withstand a motion for 
summary judgment. Blair, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16809, at 
*20-21 (citing Wells v. Shalala, 228 F.3d 1137, 1144 (10th 
Cir. 2000); Taylor v. Monsanto Co., 150 F.3d 806, 809 (7th 
Cir. 1998); Rose-Maston v. NME Hospitals, Inc. , 133 F.3d 
1104, 1109 (8th Cir. 1998); Lindemann v. Empress Casino 
Hammond Corp., No. 97-C-8938, 1999 WL 59839, *4 (N.D. 
Ill. Jan. 27, 1999)). In order to satisfy the standard for 
summary judgment "the affiant must ordinarily set forth 
facts, rather than opinions or conclusions. An affidavit 
that is `essentially conclusory' and lacking in specific facts 
is inadequate to satisfy the movant [or non-movant]'s 
burden." Maldonado v. Ramirez, 757 F.2d 48, 51 (3d Cir. 
1985) (quotation omitted). 
 
Also missing from Blair's submission is any information 
about the estimated cost of arbitration, such as the fees 
charged by AAA arbitrators in her area. Blair plausibly 
argues that the fact that her affidavit shows that her net 
income is negative indicates that she could not afford to 
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pay any costs of arbitration, no matter how much or how 
little they prove to be, but Green Tree tells us we need 
greater proof in order to find Blair's burden satisfied. 
 
The EEOC, appearing as an amicus, suggests that in 
light of Green Tree we must remand to the District Court 
for further factual inquiry on the issue of arbitrator's fees. 
The EEOC emphasizes the importance of addressing this 
issue pre-arbitration since a decision to foreclose access to 
a judicial forum exposes claimants to potentially large 
arbitration costs that might deter them from pursuing 
arbitration at all. It reiterates the Supreme Court's 
statements in Gilmer that individuals may be required to 
arbitrate statutory claims of discrimination but that the 
arbitration agreement must not force a party to"forgo the 
substantive rights afforded by the statute." Gilmer, 500 U.S. 
at 26 (quoting Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628). If Blair is 
ordered to arbitration without a full inquiry, she may be 
forced to relinquish her rights under the discrimination 
statute due to her inability to afford the cost of defending 
those rights. 
 
Because the District Court did not have the advantage of 
the Green Tree opinion, its decision, which accurately 
anticipated much of the Supreme Court's later decision, 
nonetheless did not fully explore the cost issue. As the 
EEOC notes, Green Tree established the right of a claimant 
to invoke discovery procedures in the pre-arbitration 
proceeding in order to assist the claimant in meeting her 
burden of showing the likelihood of bearing prohibitive 
costs. Although discovery is ordinarily not undertaken at 
such an early stage of a proceeding that is governed by an 
arbitration agreement, there is language in the Supreme 
Court's opinion faulting the claimant for not presenting 
evidence "during discovery." Green Tree , 531 U.S. at 92. 
Additionally, the EEOC cites an interchange during oral 
arguments before the Supreme Court that indicates that 
the Supreme Court assumed that discovery was available. 
Br. of EEOC at 12.4 Without some discovery, albeit limited 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The EEOC quotes excerpts from the oral argument before the Supreme 
Court in Green Tree, in which the Court asked the claimant why she did 
not " `make any showing' in the district court on the issue of arbitration 
 
                                22 
  
to the narrow issue of the estimated costs of arbitration 
and the claimant's ability to pay, it is not clear how a 
claimant could present information on the costs of 
arbitration as required by Green Tree and how the 
defendant could meet its burden to rebut the claimant's 
allegation that she cannot afford to share the cost. See, 
e.g., Livingston v. Associates Fin., Inc., 2001 WL 709465, at 
*2 (N.D. Ill. June 25, 2001) (holding that the only way a 
claimant can uncover the reasonably specific facts required 
by Green Tree is through limited discovery since "it seems 
axiomatic that, if the Supreme Court places a burden of 
proof on a party, then that party must be given an 
opportunity to pursue discovery related to the issue that it 
has the burden to prove"). 
 
Several cases since Green Tree have tried to articulate 
what a claimant needs to show in order to meet her burden 
on this issue. In Bradford v. Rockwell Semiconductor 
Systems Inc., 238 F.3d 549 (4th Cir. 2001), the court held 
that the determination of whether fee-splitting renders an 
agreement unenforceable must be examined on a case-by- 
case basis rather than through the application of a broad 
per se rule against all fee-splitting. Id. at 556. The court 
stated, 
 
       [T]he appropriate inquiry is one that evaluates whether 
       the arbitral forum in a particular case is an adequate 
       and accessible substitute to litigation, i.e., a case-by- 
       case analysis that focuses, among other things, upon 
       the claimant's ability to pay the arbitration fees and 
       costs, the expected cost differential between arbitration 
       and litigation in court, and whether that cost 
       differential is so substantial as to deter the bringing of 
       claims.  
 
Id. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
costs . . . criticized the claimant for not seeking`discovery going to the 
costs of arbitration' . . . opined that `proof could be offered in the 
district 
court, before the arbitration' on the fees issue . .. [and] asked whether 
the claimant could have sought `discovery' concerning `the costs of 
arbitration.' " Br. of EEOC at 12 (quoting Transcript of Oral Argument in 
Green Tree, 2000 WL 1513141, at *35-39, 54). 
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The court cautioned that these objections should be 
raised in court prior to arbitration. Id. at 558 n.7. Its 
encouragement of a pre-arbitration, case-by-case evaluation 
of the claimant's expected costs and ability to pay 
necessarily implies that some factual inquiry will be 
authorized. Id. at 556 n.5. The court found that Bradford 
had not demonstrated that he was unable to pay or that he 
was deterred from arbitration since Bradford, unlike Blair, 
had initiated arbitration before litigation and proceeded 
through a full arbitration hearing on the merits of his 
claim, demonstrating conclusively that he was not deterred 
from entering into arbitration. Id. at 558. Evidence in his 
case also showed that he earned a salary of $115,000 in 
addition to yearly bonuses prior to his discharge. Id. at 558 
n.6. 
 
A number of district courts have looked at these issues, 
including courts in this circuit. See, e.g., Giordano v. Pep 
Boys--Manny, Moe & Jack, Inc., No. Civ. A. 99-1281, 2001 
WL 484360, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 2001) (finding Green 
Tree does not "mandate a searching inquiry into an 
employee's bills and expenses," that the focus should be on 
the costs of arbitration, and when the agreement required 
the claimant who earned only $400 a week to pay half the 
costs of arbitration, the agreement was unenforceable and 
the employer must bear all of the costs); Goodman v. ESPE 
America, Inc., No. 00-CV-862, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 433, 
at *13-14 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 19, 2001) (rejecting a per se rule 
that fee-splitting is unenforceable and finding that claimant 
who earned a base salary of $80,000 was able to afford the 
costs of arbitration). 
 
The EEOC suggests that the existence of the fee- 
allocation provision requiring Blair to pay one-half of the 
arbitrator's fees satisfies her threshold burden of presenting 
evidence of the "likelihood" of incurring"prohibitive" costs, 
and that the burden has now shifted to Scott to show 
contrary evidence. In the alternative, it argues that the 
existence of this provision is sufficient to trigger Blair's 
right to discovery on this issue. The EEOC argues that 
remand is appropriate in this case, where it was not in 
Green Tree, because in Green Tree the arbitration 
agreement was silent on the subject of fees, rendering the 
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risk that the claimant "will be saddled with prohibitive 
costs" too speculative, whereas here the claimant is clearly 
required to pay one-half of the arbitrator's fees. 
 
Blair would have us hold that the mere existence of a fee- 
splitting provision in an agreement would satisfy the 
claimant's burden to prove the likelihood of incurring 
prohibitive costs under Green Tree, 530 U.S. at 92. We 
decline to do so. It would be inconsistent with Green Tree 
and would run counter to the strong federal preference for 
arbitration and the liberal policy regarding arbitration. 
Accord Bradford, 238 F.3d at 557. 
 
However, we agree with the EEOC that a remand is 
appropriate in light of Blair's affidavit of her limited 
financial capacity, the evidence that the AAA would preside 
over the arbitration, and the AAA rules requiring the parties 
to bear equally the costs of the arbitrator's fees. Limited 
discovery into the rates charged by the AAA and the 
approximate length of similar arbitration proceedings 
should adequately establish the costs of arbitration, and 
give Blair the opportunity to prove, as required under Green 
Tree, that resort to arbitration would deny her a forum to 
vindicate her statutory rights. Scott should also be given 
the opportunity to meet its burden to prove that arbitration 
will not be prohibitively expensive, or as has been 
suggested in other cases, offer to pay all of the arbitrator's 
fees. 
 
D. Great Western 
 
The District Court relied upon this court's decision in 
Great Western Mortgage Corp. v. Peacock, 110 F.3d 222 (3d 
Cir. 1997), to find Blair's claims regarding the statute of 
limitations and waiver of a jury trial right to be issues for 
the arbitrator and not the court. In Great Western, this 
court, finding no contrary state policy, rejected the 
plaintiff's argument that her arbitration agreement was void 
as a matter of public policy. It left to the arbitrator the 
decision of whether the plaintiff waived any rights under 
state laws. Id. at 231. Blair argues Great Western was in 
error and should be reversed. The Great Western  decision 
has not been overruled and may only be reversed by this 
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court en banc. See 3d Cir. Internal Operating P. 9.1. It is 
this "court's tradition that a panel may not overrule or 
disregard a prior panel decision unless that decision has 
been overruled by the Supreme Court or by our own court 
sitting en banc." Patriot Party v. Allegheny County Dep't of 
Elections, Nos. 96-3677, 96-3359, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 
12688, at *6 (3d Cir. June 15, 1998) (citing Nationwide Ins. 
Co. of Columbus, Ohio v. Patterson, 953 F.2d 44, 46 (3d Cir. 
1991)). 
 
Blair contends in her reply brief that Great Western was 
implicitly overruled by Green Tree. She argues that the 
decision in Great Western deferring public policy questions 
to the arbitrator is in conflict with the decision in Green 
Tree allowing the court to invalidate an arbitration 
agreement based on prohibitive costs. 
 
We disagree. Both decisions articulate similar scopes of 
inquiry for district courts evaluating arbitration 
agreements, first, whether there was an arbitration 
agreement, and second, whether that agreement was valid. 
Great Western, 110 F.3d at 228; Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 90 
("[W]e first ask whether the parties agreed to submit their 
claims to arbitration, and then ask whether Congress has 
evinced an intention to preclude a waiver of judicial 
remedies for the statutory rights at issue."). Both decisions 
recognize the strong presumption in favor of arbitration and 
that doubts " `concerning the scope of arbitrable issues 
should be resolved in favor of arbitration.' " Great Western, 
110 F.3d at 228 (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp., 460 
U.S. at 24-25 (1983)); see also Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 91 
(citing Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp., 531 U.S. at 24). Great 
Western held that the question of whether the arbitration 
agreement validly waived certain rights afforded by New 
Jersey law could be presented in the arbitral forum, but 
also evaluated that claim on the merits and found that the 
claimant had not demonstrated any New Jersey policy 
against arbitration. 110 F.3d at 231-32. Because Great 
Western did not foreclose the ability of courts to examine 
public policy arguments, it is not in conflict with the 
holding of Green Tree, and has not been overruled.5 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The PHRC filed an amicus brief arguing that requiring a victim of 
employment discrimination to pay fees to protect her rights is contrary 
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Finally, Scott argues that this court should affirm the 
earlier order of the District Court dismissing Blair's 
complaint "with prejudice" because Blair did not file for 
arbitration within one year, as provided for in the 
arbitration agreement. The District Court did not address 
the statute of limitations outside of recognizing Blair's 
argument that the statute of limitations in the arbitration 
agreement conflicts with the underlying statutory 
limitations periods. We agree with the District Court that 
this question, and others relating to the statute of  
limitations,6 should be deferred to the arbitrator. 
 
IV. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
For the reasons set forth above, we will reverse the 
decision of the District Court and remand for further 
factual inquiry into the costs of arbitration and Blair's 
ability or inability to pay for arbitration. 
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to the public policy of Pennsylvania guaranteeing a costless forum for 
enforcing her rights, and that the arbitration agreement did not foreclose 
the claimant's opportunity to bring a claim before the PHRC. Blair's 
administrative complaint was dismissed by the PHRC for failure of proof 
or failure to cooperate. The question whether arbitration is contrary to 
Pennsylvania public policy is not at issue in this case, and we do not 
reach to decide it. 
 
6. For example, Blair argues that the one-year limitation period in the 
agreement with Scott conflicts with the incorporated AAA rules that 
provide that timeliness should be based on the statutes of limitations in 
the underlying statutes on which the claims are based, and that the 
ambiguity should be construed against the maker of the contract. See, 
e.g., Burns v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., 301 A.2d 799, 804 (Pa. 1973). 
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